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• Group knowledge is all about dynamics
• Group ability is fundamental in reasoning about group 
knowledge
• Until recently common knowledge has received most 
attention in the dynamic epistemic logic literature 
• I will focus a little more on distributed knowledge
hthis talkiCall of you:
Plan
• Background: multi-agent epistemic/doxastic logic 
• Group knowledge 
• Group belief 
• Generalised 
• Adding dynamics 
• Group ability and group knowledge 
• General ability 
• Ability through informative updates 
• Maximal ability
Background
We assume given
a finite set N = {1, . . . , n} of agents
a countably infinite set of primitive propositions
let GR = }(N) \ ; (the set of non-empty groups)
027
Models
A model is a tuple M = hW,⇠1, . . . ,⇠n, V i:
• W is a set of states
• ⇠i is an accessibility relation
– Assumed to be an equivalence relation (S5) when
we model knowledge
– Assumed have weaker properties when we talk
about belief, e.g., transitive, euclidian and serial
(KD45)
• V is a valuation function, assigning primitive propo-
sitions to each state
Epistemic/doxastic logic
Language EL:   ::= p | Ki  | ¬  |  1 ^  2
Interpretation:
M, s |= p i↵ p 2 V (s)
M, s |= Ki  i↵ for all t s.t. s ⇠i t, (M, t) |=  
M, s |= ¬  i↵ M, s 6|=  
M, s |=   ^  i↵ M, s |=   and M, s |=  
For belief we often write Bi instead of Ki
Group Knowledge
General Knowledge (“everybody-knows”)
M, s |= EG  i↵ for all t s.t. s ⇠EG t, (M, t) |=  
⇠EG=
S
i2G ⇠i G 2 GR
General Knowledge (“everybody-knows”)
Already expressible: EG  ⌘
V
i2GKi 
M, s |= EG  i↵ for all t s.t. s ⇠EG t, (M, t) |=  
⇠EG=
S
i2G ⇠i G 2 GR
Common Knowledge
M, s |= CG  i↵ for all t s.t. s ⇠CG t, (M, t) |=  
⇠CG= (
S
i2G ⇠i)⇤
G 2 GR
Lew
is, 1969
Aum
ann, 1976
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“. . . the knowledge of   is distributed among its mem-
bers, so that by pooling their knowledge together the
members of the group can deduce  ”
“. . . it should be possible for the members of the
group to establish   through communication”
van der Hoek et al., 1999
Roelofsen, 2006
“. . . the knowledge that would result of the agents
could somehow ‘combine’ their knowledge”029
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What Distributed Knowledge Actually Is
• Common interpretations of distributed knowledge:

• Knowledge the group could obtain if they had unlimited means of 
communication

• “A group has distributed knowledge of a fact phi if the knowledge of 
phi is distributed among its members, so that by pooling their 
knowledge together the members of the group can deduce phi ...”
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What Distributed Knowledge Actually Is
• Common interpretations of distributed knowledge:

• Knowledge the group could obtain if they had unlimited means of 
communication

• “A group has distributed knowledge of a fact phi if the knowledge of 
phi is distributed among its members, so that by pooling their 
knowledge together the members of the group can deduce phi ...”
A group has distributed knowledge of a fact phi 
if after “pooling their knowledge together” the 
members of the group know that phi was 
true before they did that
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Alternative definition of common belief
Group Belief 
Generalised Distributed Belief
Distributed belief
• The group considers a state

• possible iﬀ all the agents in the group considers it possible

• impossible iﬀ at least one member of the group considers it impossible

• For S5 agents this makes sense

• If an S5 agent considers a state impossible, then it is impossible

• .. and this is common knowledge
⇠DG=
T
i2G ⇠i
032
Distributed belief for non-S5 agents
• For non-S5 agents, in particular agents without T/reflexivity (e.g., KD45):

• If one agent considers a state impossible, that agent might in fact be wrong

• Ruling out a state based on the evidence of a single agent is then a very 
credulous group attitude

• Curious asymmetry between the evidence need for possibility vs. 
impossibility

• impossibility: every agent is a veto voter, possibility: unanimity 
⇠DG=
T
i2G ⇠i
Generalised Distributed Belief
• The group considers a state

• possible iﬀ at least k agents in the group considers it possible

• impossible iﬀ not at least k agents in the group considers it impossible
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i2H
⇠i
The 
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distributed 
belief 
operator
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The 
generalised 
distributed 
belief 
operator E.g., ⇠majG =⇠+d(|G|+1)/2eG
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Generalised distributed belief: the extremes
• k = |G|: the group considers a state

• impossible iﬀ at least one member of the group considers it impossible

• possible iﬀ all the agents in the group considers it possible
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Generalised distributed belief: the extremes
• k = |G|: the group considers a state

• impossible iﬀ at least one member of the group considers it impossible

• possible iﬀ all the agents in the group considers it possible
• k = 1: the group considers a state

• impossible iﬀ all agents in the group considers it impossible

• possible at least one agent in the group considers it possible
⇠+kG =
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\
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st ndard distributed b lief
⇠+|G|G =⇠DG
general belief (everybody believes)
⇠+1G =⇠EG
Generalised distributed belief: conclusions
• Between distributed and general belief

• Intuitively two entirely diﬀerent concepts

• Diﬀerence between them can be explained quantitatively rather than 
qualitatively

• Specific instances of the same concept, corresponding to which voting 
threshold is used

• There is a scale of intermediate concepts between them
Adding dynamics
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PC All instances of propositional tautologies
KK Ka('!  )! Ka'! Ka TK Ka'! '
KD DA('!  )! DA'! DA TD DA'! '
5K ¬Ka'! Ka¬Ka' 5D ¬DA'! DA¬DA'
DK1 Ka'$ Da', if a 2 N DK2 DA'! DB', if A ✓ B
R[]p [']p$ ('! p) R[]¬ [']¬ $ ('! ¬['] )
R[]^ [']( ^  )$ (['] ^ ['] ) R[]K [']Ka $ ('! Ka['] )
R[]D [']DA $ ('! DA['] ) R[][] ['][ ] $ [' ^ ['] ] 
MP ` ' & ` '!  ) `  NK ` ') ` Ka'
Sound and complete: by reduction to ELD.
PAD:   ::= p | Ki  | DG  | [ ]  | ¬  |  1 ^  2
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Public Announcement Logic with Common 
Knowledge
PC All instances of tautologies CK1 CA('! EA')! '! CA'
TK Ka'! ' CK2 CA'! ' ^ EACA'
KK Ka('!  )! Ka'! Ka KC CA('!  )! CA'! CA 
5K ¬Ka'! Ka¬Ka' NC ` ') ` CA'
R[]p [']p$ ('! p) R[]C `  ! ['] & `   ^ '! EA 
R[]¬ [']¬ $ ('! ¬['] ) +
R[]^ [']( ^  )$ (['] ^ ['] ) `  ! [']CA 
R[]K [']Ka $ ('! Ka['] )
R[][] ['][ ] $ [' ^ ['] ] 
MP ` ' & ` '!  ) `  
NK ` ') ` Ka'
N[] ` ') ` [ ]'
PAC:   ::= p | Ki  | CG  | [ ]  | ¬  |  1 ^  2
Baltag et al., 1998
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• Model updates
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• S5
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A note on completeness proofs for epistemic 
logic with distributed knowledge 
Several claims about completeness for ELD can be 
found in the literature (Fagin et al. 1992, van der 
Hoek and Meyer 1992, Halpern and Moses 1992, 
Fagin et al. 1995, van der Hoek and Meyer 1997, 
Gerbrandy 1999). Most of them either 
- only allow distributed knowledge operators for the 
grand coalition; and/or 
- do not provide detailed proofs.
Public Announcement Logic with Common and 
Distributed Knowledge: expressivity
S5D ⌘ PAD // S5CD
%%
S5 ⌘ PAL //
66
S5C //
77
PAC // PACD
W
áng and Ågotnes, Synthese 190
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Public Announcement Logic with Common and 
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S5D ⌘ PAD // S5CD
%%
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Open problem: relax S5 assumptions
Some complexity results
Logic Result Reference
EL PSPACE-complete Halpern and Moses 1992
ELC EXPTIME-complete Fisher and Ladner 1977
ELD (D only for grand coal.) PSPACE-complete Halpern and Moses 1992
ELCD (C,D only for grand coal.) EXPTIME-complete Halpern and Moses 1992
ELCD (no restrictions) EXPTIME-complete Wa´ng and A˚gotnes 2013
PA PSPACE-complete (follows)
PAD PSPACE-complete (follows)
PAC EXPTIME-complete Lutz 2006
PACD EXPTIME-complete Wa´ng and A˚gotnes 2013
Ability
Coalitional Ability Logics
• Logics with coalition operators. Typical notation:

• where C is a coalition (= set of agents, possibly empty)

• intuitive meaning: C has the ability to make phi true
h[C]i  [C] hhCii 
Coalitional Ability Logics
• Pauly’s Coalition Logic (CL): 

• extends propositional logic with coalition operators

• interpreted in game structures: ability = the coalition can choose a joint 
action such that phi becomes true no matter what the other agents do 
• Alur et al.’s Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL): 

• can be seen as a combination of CL and CTL

• ability = the coalition can choose a joint strategy such that phi becomes 
true no matter what the other agents do

• Seeing-to-it-that (STIT) logics 

• van Benthem on forcing

• …
  ::= p | ¬  |  1 ^  2 | h[C]i 
' ::= p | ¬' | ' ^ ' | h[A]i g' | h[A]i⇤' | h[A]i'U '
Coalitional ability: examples
h[alibaba, tencent ]i¬applepay successful
h[Thomas ,Meiyun]i⌃students happy
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Alternative: neighbourhood semantics.
Pauly, JLC 2004
Coalition Logic
  ::= p | ¬  |  1 ^  2 | h[C]i  C ✓ N
Playable e↵ectivity function in each state: Es : }(N)! }(}(S))
1. 8C ✓ N : ; 62 Es(C)
2. 8C ✓ N : S 2 Es(C)
3. 8X ✓ S: S \X 62 Es(;)) X 2 Es(N)
4. 8C: 8X ✓ X 0 ✓ S: X 2 Es(C)) X 0 2 Es(C) (outcome-monotonicity)
5. 8C1 ✓ N : 8C2 ✓ N : 8X1 ✓ S: 8X2 ✓ S: (C1 \C2 = ; and X1 2 Es(C1)
and X2 2 Es(C2)) ) X1 \X2 2 E(C1 [ C2) (superadditivity)
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C,D}} D,C !!
D,D
((•3,3 •0,5 •5,0 •1,1
M, s |= h[Ann]ijailB
M, s |= h[C]i ,  M 2 Es(C)
Alternative: neighbourhood semantics.
Pauly, JLC 2004
Coalition Logic
  ::= p | ¬  |  1 ^  2 | h[C]i  C ✓ N
Playable e↵ectivity function in each state: Es : }(N)! }(}(S))
1. 8C ✓ N : ; 62 Es(C)
2. 8C ✓ N : S 2 Es(C)
3. 8X ✓ S: S \X 62 Es(;)) X 2 Es(N)
4. 8C: 8X ✓ X 0 ✓ S: X 2 Es(C)) X 0 2 Es(C) (outcome-monotonicity)
5. 8C1 ✓ N : 8C2 ✓ N : 8X1 ✓ S: 8X2 ✓ S: (C1 \C2 = ; and X1 2 Es(C1)
and X2 2 Es(C2)) ) X1 \X2 2 E(C1 [ C2) (superadditivity)
M: •s
C,C
vv
C,D}} D,C !!
D,D
((•3,3 •0,5 •5,0 •1,1
M, s |= h[Ann]ijailB
M, s |= h[C]i ,  M 2 Es(C)
Alternative: neighbourhood semantics.
Pauly, JLC 2004
Representation theorem:
equivalent semantics.
G
oranko et al., AAM
AS 2010
Epistemic Coalition Logic
  ::= p | ¬  |   ^   | h[G]i  | Ki  | CG0  | DG0 
G0 2 GR
G ✓ N
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Epistemic Coalition Logic
  ::= p | ¬  |   ^   | h[G]i  | Ki  | CG0  | DG0 
G0 2 GR
G ✓ N
Epistemic Coalition Logic
Ki ! h[{i}]iKj : i can communicate her knowledge of   to j
  ::= p | ¬  |   ^   | h[G]i  | Ki  | CG0  | DG0 
G0 2 GR
G ✓ N
Epistemic Coalition Logic
Ki ! h[{i}]iKj : i can communicate her knowledge of   to j
CG  ! h[G]i : common knowledge in G of   is su cient
for G to ensure that  
  ::= p | ¬  |   ^   | h[G]i  | Ki  | CG0  | DG0 
G0 2 GR
G ✓ N
Epistemic Coalition Logic
Ki ! h[{i}]iKj : i can communicate her knowledge of   to j
CG  ! h[G]i : common knowledge in G of   is su cient
for G to ensure that  
h[G]i ! DG : distributed knowledge in G of   is necessary
for G to ensure that  
  ::= p | ¬  |   ^   | h[G]i  | Ki  | CG0  | DG0 
G0 2 GR
G ✓ N
Epistemic Coalition Logic
Ki ! h[{i}]iKj : i can communicate her knowledge of   to j
CG  ! h[G]i : common knowledge in G of   is su cient
for G to ensure that  
h[G]i ! DG : distributed knowledge in G of   is necessary
for G to ensure that  
DG  ! h[G]iEG : G can cooperate to make distributed
knowledge explicit
  ::= p | ¬  |   ^   | h[G]i  | Ki  | CG0  | DG0 
G0 2 GR
G ✓ N
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Epistemic Coalition Logic
Ågotnes and Alechina, JLC 2016
  ::= p | ¬  |   ^   | h[G]i  | Ki  | CG0  | DG0 
Epistemic Coalition Logic
K Ki( !  )! (Ki ! Ki )
T Ki !  
4 Ki ! KiKi 
5 ¬Ki ! Ki¬Ki 
C CG ! EG(  ^ CG )
RN `CLC  )`CLC Ki 
RC `CLC  ! EG(  ^  ))`CLC  ! CG 
DK DG( !  )! (DG ! DG )
DT DG !  
D4 DG ! DGDG 
D5 ¬DG ! DG¬DG 
D1 Ki $ Di 
D2 DG ! DH , if G ✓ H
Sound and complete
(all combinations of operators: CLK, CLD, CLC, CLCD)
Ågotnes and Alechina, JLC 2016
  ::= p | ¬  |   ^   | h[G]i  | Ki  | CG0  | DG0 
Epistemic Coalition Logic: adding interaction 
axioms
Ågotnes and Alechina, JLC 2016Open problem: completeness of ECL with the distributed 
knowledge axiom
Property Axiom Completeness?
s ⇠i t) E(s)(i) = E(t)(i) h[i]i'! Kih[i]i' Yes
s ⇠CG t) E(s)(G) = E(t)(G) h[G]i'! CGh[G]i' Yes
s ⇠DG t) E(s)(G) = E(t)(G) h[G]i'! DGh[G]i' ?
Some complexity results
Logic Result Reference
EL PSPACE-complete Halpern and Moses 1992
ELC EXPTIME-complete Fisher and Ladner 1977
ELD (D only for grand coal.) PSPACE-complete Halpern and Moses 1992
ELCD (C,D only for grand coal.) EXPTIME-complete Halpern and Moses 1992
ELCD (no restrictions) EXPTIME-complete Wa´ng and A˚gotnes 2013
PA PSPACE-complete (follows)
PAD PSPACE-complete (follows)
PAC EXPTIME-complete Lutz 2006
PACD EXPTIME-complete Wa´ng and A˚gotnes 2013
CL PSPACE-complete Pauly 2002
CLC EXPTIME-complete A˚gotnes and Alechina 2016
CLCD EXPTIME-complete A˚gotnes and Alechina 2016
CLD PSPACE-complete A˚gotnes and Alechina 2016
CLD+ PSPACE-complete A˚gotnes and Alechina 2016
CLC+ unknown
ATL with group knowledge
• Plain ATL completely axiomatised  
• A lot of work on epistemic extensions, but no 
completeness proof yet 
• Completeness claim with common knowledge only
Open problem: complete axiomatisation of ATL with group 
knowledge
Goranko and van Drimmelen, Th. Comp. Sci. 2007
van der Hoek and Wooldridge, Studia Logica 2003
Goranko et al., LOFT 2014
' ::= p | ¬' | ' ^ ' | h[A]i g' | h[A]i⇤' | h[A]i'U ' |
CA' | EA' | DA'
Epistemic ATL: knowing that vs. knowing how 
(knowledge of ability de dicto vs. de re)
??: G has a strategy that in every G-reachable state
will ensure  
Jam
roga and van der Hoek 2004
Ågotnes, G
oranko, van der Hoek, W
ooldridge, Handb. 
of Epistem
ic Logic, 2015
CGh[G]i : in everyG-reachable stateG has a strategy
that will ensure  
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Epistemic ATL: knowing that vs. knowing how 
(knowledge of ability de dicto vs. de re)
??: G has a strategy that in every G-reachable state
will ensure  
not expressible in Epistemic ATL
Jam
roga and van der Hoek 2004
Ågotnes, G
oranko, van der Hoek, W
ooldridge, Handb. 
of Epistem
ic Logic, 2015
CGh[G]i : in everyG-reachable stateG has a strategy
that will ensure  
• Common knowledge in the group: requires the least amount of 
coordination 
• General knowledge in the group 
• Distributed knowledge in the group: if they communicate they can 
identify a winning strategy 
• A single agent (e.g., the leader)  
• A subgroup (e.g., the executive committee) 
• A disjoint group (e.g., a consulting company) 
• …
Group knowing how: who knows that the group 
strategy is winning?
CGh[G]i 
Jam
roga and Ågotnes, 2007
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Group knowing how: who knows that the group 
strategy is winning?
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roga and Ågotnes, 2007
Constructive 
knowledge
• Common knowledge in the group: requires the least amount of 
coordination 
• General knowledge in the group 
• Distributed knowledge in the group: if they communicate they can 
identify a winning strategy 
• A single agent (e.g., the leader)  
• A subgroup (e.g., the executive committee) 
• A disjoint group (e.g., a consulting company) 
• …
Group knowing how: who knows that the group 
strategy is winning?
EGh[G]i 
DGh[G]i 
i 2 GKih[G]i 
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Constructive 
knowledge
• Common knowledge in the group: requires the least amount of 
coordination 
• General knowledge in the group 
• Distributed knowledge in the group: if they communicate they can 
identify a winning strategy 
• A single agent (e.g., the leader)  
• A subgroup (e.g., the executive committee) 
• A disjoint group (e.g., a consulting company) 
• …
Group knowing how: who knows that the group 
strategy is winning?
EGh[G]i 
DGh[G]i 
i 2 GKih[G]i 
H ✓ GCHh[G]i 
CGh[G]i 
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Constructive 
knowledge
• Common knowledge in the group: requires the least amount of 
coordination 
• General knowledge in the group 
• Distributed knowledge in the group: if they communicate they can 
identify a winning strategy 
• A single agent (e.g., the leader)  
• A subgroup (e.g., the executive committee) 
• A disjoint group (e.g., a consulting company) 
• …
Group knowing how: who knows that the group 
strategy is winning?
EGh[G]i 
DGh[G]i 
i 2 GKih[G]i 
H ✓ GCHh[G]i 
H \G = ;CHh[G]i 
Constructive Knowledge
' ::= p | ¬' | ' ^ ' | h[A]i g' | h[A]i⇤' | h[A]i'U ' |
CA' | EA' | DA' | CA' | EA' | DA'.
Open problems: complete axiomatisation of (even fragments of) 
ATL with constructive knowledge operators
Jam
roga and Ågotnes, 2007
Constructive Knowledge
' ::= p | ¬' | ' ^ ' | h[A]i g' | h[A]i⇤' | h[A]i'U ' |
CA' | EA' | DA' | CA' | EA' | DA'.
M, q |= CG',M, [q]⇠CG |= '
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M,Q |= h[G]i  , G has
a joint strategy that will
ensure that   is true in all
states in Q
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M, q |= CG',M, [q]⇠CG |= '
M,Q |= h[G]i  , G has
a joint strategy that will
ensure that   is true in all
states in Q
Open problems: complete axiomatisation of (even fragments of) 
ATL with constructive knowledge operators
Jam
roga and Ågotnes, 2007
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Constructive Knowledge
' ::= p | ¬' | ' ^ ' | h[A]i g' | h[A]i⇤' | h[A]i'U ' |
CA' | EA' | DA' | CA' | EA' | DA'.
M, q |= CHh[G]i' , G has a strategy that will ensure
that   is true, starting in any state H-reachable from q
I.e., H knows how G can achieve  
M, q |= CG',M, [q]⇠CG |= '
M,Q |= h[G]i  , G has
a joint strategy that will
ensure that   is true in all
states in Q
Open problems: complete axiomatisation of (even fragments of) 
ATL with constructive knowledge operators
Jam
roga and Ågotnes, 2007 Ability 
through publicly observed informational actions
What if we interpret group ability modalities directly on 
epistemic models, in terms of possible public announcements?
What if we interpret group ability modalities directly on 
epistemic models, in terms of possible public announcements?
h[G]i :
”Group G can make a
joint announcement such
that, no matter what the
other agents announce,  
will be true”
What if we interpret group ability modalities directly on 
epistemic models, in terms of possible public announcements?
hGi :
”Group G can make an
announcement after which
  is true”
h[G]i :
”Group G can make a
joint announcement such
that, no matter what the
other agents announce,  
will be true”
What if we interpret group ability modalities directly on 
epistemic models, in terms of possible public announcements?
hGi :
”Group G can make an
announcement after which
  is true”
h[G]i :
”Group G can make a
joint announcement such
that, no matter what the
other agents announce,  
will be true”
' ::= p | Ki' | ¬' | '1 ^ '2 | h'1i'2 | h[G]i 
Coalition Announcement Logic (GAL)
Ågotnes and van Ditmarsch, AAMAS 2008
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What if we interpret group ability modalities directly on 
epistemic models, in terms of possible public announcements?
hGi :
”Group G can make an
announcement after which
  is true”
h[G]i :
”Group G can make a
joint announcement such
that, no matter what the
other agents announce,  
will be true”
⇥ ::= p | Ki⇥ | ¬⇥ | ⇥1 ⇥ ⇥2 | ⇤⇥1⌅⇥2 | ⇤G⌅ 
Group Announcement Logic (GAL)
Ågotnes et al., JAL 2010
' ::= p | Ki' | ¬' | '1 ^ '2 | h'1i'2 | h[G]i 
Coalition Announcement Logic (GAL)
Ågotnes and van Ditmarsch, AAMAS 2008
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hGi :
”Group G can make an
announcement after which
  is true”
h[G]i :
”Group G can make a
joint announcement such
that, no matter what the
other agents announce,  
will be true”
⇥ ::= p | Ki⇥ | ¬⇥ | ⇥1 ⇥ ⇥2 | ⇤⇥1⌅⇥2 | ⇤G⌅ 
Group Announcement Logic (GAL)
Ågotnes et al., JAL 2010
' ::= p | Ki' | ¬' | '1 ^ '2 | h'1i'2 | h[G]i 
Coalition Announcement Logic (GAL)
Ågotnes and van Ditmarsch, AAMAS 2008
Related: Abritrary Public Announcement Logic
' ::= p | Ki' | ¬' | '1 ^ '2 | h'1i'2 | ⌃  Balbiani et al., TARK 2007
GAL: example (Russian Cards)
hAnnihBilli(one ^ two ^ three)
h{Ann,Bill}i(one ^ two ^ three)
??
GAL: expressing knowing-how
Knowledge of 
ability, de dicto
Knowledge of 
ability, de re
⇥s  a t ⇤⇥ t |= ⌅Ka⇥⇧ 
s |= Ka a⇥ 
⇤⇥ ⇥s  a t t |= ⌅Ka⇥⇧ 
??
GAL: expressing knowing-how
Knowledge of 
ability, de dicto
Knowledge of 
ability, de re
⇥s  a t ⇤⇥ t |= ⌅Ka⇥⇧ 
s |= Ka a⇥ 
 ⇥ s |= ⇥Ka⇥⇤Ka 
s |=  a⇥Ka 
⇤⇥ ⇥s  a t t |= ⌅Ka⇥⇧ 
??
GAL: expressing knowing-how
Knowledge of 
ability, de dicto
Knowledge of 
ability, de re
⇥s  a t ⇤⇥ t |= ⌅Ka⇥⇧ 
s |= Ka a⇥ 
 ⇥ s |= ⇥Ka⇥⇤Ka 
s |=  a⇥Ka 
⇤⇥ ⇥s  a t t |= ⌅Ka⇥⇧ 
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GAL: expressing knowing-how
Knowledge of 
ability, de dicto
Knowledge of 
ability, de re
⇥s  a t ⇤⇥ t |= ⌅Ka⇥⇧ 
s |= Ka a⇥ 
 ⇥ s |= ⇥Ka⇥⇤Ka 
s |=  a⇥Ka 
⇤⇥ ⇥s  a t t |= ⌅Ka⇥⇧ 
Depends on 
(1) the fact that 
actions are 
announcements 
(2) the S5 properties
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⇤⇥ ⇥s  a t t |= ⌅Ka⇥⇧  s |= haiKa 
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T
i2G ⇠i), t |= h
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GAL: expressing knowing-how
⇤⇥ ⇥s  a t t |= ⌅Ka⇥⇧  s |= haiKa 
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T
i2G ⇠i), t |= h
V
i2GKi ii  s |= hGiDG 
9{ i : i 2 G} 8(s, t) 2 (
S
i2G ⇠i)⇤, t |= h
V
i2GKi ii  s |= hGiCG 
9{ i : i 2 G} 8(s, t) 2 (
S
i2G ⇠i), t |= h
V
i2GKi ii  s |= hGiEG 
GAL: expressing knowing-how
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S
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V
i2GKi ii  s |= hGiCG 
9{ i : i 2 G} 8(s, t) 2 (
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GAL: expressing knowing-how
⇤⇥ ⇥s  a t t |= ⌅Ka⇥⇧  s |= haiKa 
9{ i : i 2 G} 8(s, t) 2 (
T
i2G ⇠i), t |= h
V
i2GKi ii  s |= hGiDG 
9{ i : i 2 G} 8(s, t) 2 (
S
i2G ⇠i)⇤, t |= h
V
i2GKi ii  s |= hGiCG 
9{ i : i 2 G} 8(s, t) 2 (
S
i2G ⇠i), t |= h
V
i2GKi ii  s |= hGiEG 
Open problem: express common knowledge de re
GAL: infinitary axiomatisation
Propositional tautologies [']p$ ('! p)
Ka('!  )! Ka'! Ka [']¬ $ ('! ¬['] )
Ka'! ' [']( ^  )$ (['] ^ ['] )
Ka'! KaKa' [']Ka $ ('! Ka['] )
¬Ka'! Ka¬Ka' ['][ ] $ [' ^ ['] ] 
` ')` Ka' [G]'! [ G]'
` '!  ,` ')`  ` ')` [G]'
8 G :` ⌘([ G]'))` ⌘([G]')
⌘(]) ::= ] | '! ⌘(]) | Ka⌘(]) | [']⌘(])
Sound and complete.
GAL: infinitary axiomatisation
Propositional tautologies [']p$ ('! p)
Ka('!  )! Ka'! Ka [']¬ $ ('! ¬['] )
Ka'! ' [']( ^  )$ (['] ^ ['] )
Ka'! KaKa' [']Ka $ ('! Ka['] )
¬Ka'! Ka¬Ka' ['][ ] $ [' ^ ['] ] 
` ')` Ka' [G]'! [ G]'
` '!  ,` ')`  ` ')` [G]'
8 G :` ⌘([ G]'))` ⌘([G]')
Open problem: finitary axiomatisation (same for APAL)
⌘(]) ::= ] | '! ⌘(]) | Ka⌘(]) | [']⌘(])
Sound and complete.
GAL-D: ability and distributed knowledge
' ::= p | Ki' | ¬' | '1 ^ '2 | h'1i'2 | hGi  | DG 
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Detour: Distributed Knowledge and the Principle of 
Full Communication
Full communication: M, s |= DG ) KSG(M, s) `  
van der Hoek et al., 1999KSG(M, s) = { 2 LEL : M, s |=
W
i2GKa }
Detour: Distributed Knowledge and the Principle of 
Full Communication
Full communication: M, s |= DG ) KSG(M, s) `  
Does not always hold.
van der Hoek et al., 1999KSG(M, s) = { 2 LEL : M, s |=
W
i2GKa }
Detour: Distributed Knowledge and the Principle of 
Full Communication
Full communication: M, s |= DG ) KSG(M, s) `  
Does not always hold.
van der Hoek et al., 1999
Roelofsen gives a complete characterisation of the
models in which it does.
Roelofsen, 2006
KSG(M, s) = { 2 LEL : M, s |=
W
i2GKa }
Detour: Distributed Knowledge and the Principle of 
Full Communication
Full communication: M, s |= DG ) KSG(M, s) `  
Does not always hold.
van der Hoek et al., 1999
Roelofsen gives a complete characterisation of the
models in which it does.
Roelofsen, 2006
KSG(M, s) = { 2 LEL : M, s |=
W
i2GKa }
van Benthem
, 2002
van Benthem: what about public communication?
GAL-D: ability and distributed knowledge
' ::= p | Ki' | ¬' | '1 ^ '2 | h'1i'2 | hGi  | DG 
GAL-D: ability and distributed knowledge
DG ! hGiEG 
' ::= p | Ki' | ¬' | '1 ^ '2 | h'1i'2 | hGi  | DG 
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GAL-D: ability and distributed knowledge
DG ! hGiEG 
•¬ps 1
1
1
•pt 2
1,2
1
•¬pu
2
•pv
1
•pw
' ::= p | Ki' | ¬' | '1 ^ '2 | h'1i'2 | hGi  | DG 
GAL-D: ability and distributed knowledge
DG ! hGiEG 
•¬ps 1
1
1
•pt 2
1,2
1
•¬pu
2
•pv
1
•pw
M, t |= D{1,2}(p ^ ¬K1p)
' ::= p | Ki' | ¬' | '1 ^ '2 | h'1i'2 | hGi  | DG 
GAL-D: ability and distributed knowledge
DG ! hGiEG 
•¬ps 1
1
1
•pt 2
1,2
1
•¬pu
2
•pv
1
•pw
M, t |= D{1,2}(p ^ ¬K1p)
E{1,2}(p ^ ¬K1p) not S5-consistent
' ::= p | Ki' | ¬' | '1 ^ '2 | h'1i'2 | hGi  | DG 
GAL-D: ability and distributed knowledge
DG ! hGiEG 
•¬ps 1
1
1
•pt 2
1,2
1
•¬pu
2
•pv
1
•pw
M, t |= D{1,2}(p ^ ¬K1p)
E{1,2}(p ^ ¬K1p) not S5-consistent
6|=
' ::= p | Ki' | ¬' | '1 ^ '2 | h'1i'2 | hGi  | DG 
Group announcement logic with distributed 
knowledge
G
alim
ullin, Ågotnes and Alechina, LO
RI 2019
(A0) Propositional tautologies (A11) [']p$ ('! p)
(A1) Ka('!  )! Ka'! Ka (A12) [']¬ $ ('! ¬['] )
(A2) Ka'! ' (A13) [']( ^  )$ (['] ^ ['] )
(A3) Ka'! KaKa' (A14) [']Ka $ ('! Ka['] )
(A4) ¬Ka'! Ka¬Ka' (A15) [']DG $ ('! DG['] )
(A5) DG('!  )! DG'! DG (A16) ['][ ] $ [' ^ ['] ] 
(A6) DG'! ' (A17) [G]'! [ G]'
(A7) DG'! DGDG' (R0) ` '!  ,` ')`  
(A8) ¬DG'! DG¬DG' (R1) ` ')` Ka'
(A9) Da'$ Ka' (R2) ` ')` [G]'
(A10) DG'! DH', if G ✓ H (R3) 8 G :` ⌘([ G]'))` ⌘([G]')
' ::= p | Ki' | ¬' | '1 ^ '2 | h'1i'2 | hGi  | DG 
Sound and complete.
Group announcement logic with distributed 
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Complexity
Logic Result Reference
EL PSPACE-complete Halpern and Moses 1992
ELC EXPTIME-complete Fisher and Ladner 1977
ELD (D only for grand coal.) PSPACE-complete Halpern and Moses 1992
ELCD (C,D only for grand coal.) EXPTIME-complete Halpern and Moses 1992
ELCD (no restrictions) EXPTIME-complete Wa´ng and A˚gotnes 2013
PA PSPACE-complete (follows)
PAD PSPACE-complete (follows)
PAC EXPTIME-complete Lutz 2006
PACD EXPTIME-complete Wa´ng and A˚gotnes 2013
CL PSPACE-complete Pauly 2002
CLC EXPTIME-complete A˚gotnes and Alechina 2016
CLCD EXPTIME-complete A˚gotnes and Alechina 2016
CLD PSPACE-complete A˚gotnes and Alechina 2016
CLD+ PSPACE-complete A˚gotnes and Alechina 2016
CLC+ unknown
AT L EXPTIME-complete Walther et al. 2005
AT EL EXPTIME-complete Walther 2005
APAL undecidable van Ditmarsch and French, 2008
GAL undecidable A˚gotnes, van Ditmarsch and French, 2016
CAL undecidable A˚gotnes,van Ditmarsch and French, 2016
Resolving Distributed Knowledge
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What do other agents know about the fact that a 
group G resolve their knowledge?
• We assume that it is common knowledge that G resolve their knowledge
What do other agents know about the fact that a 
group G resolve their knowledge?
• We assume that it is common knowledge that G resolve their knowledge
M = (S,⇠1, . . . ,⇠n, V ) (S5 model)
For a group of agents G, the (global) G-resolved update of
M is the modelM |G whereM |G = (S0,⇠01, . . . ,⇠0n, V 0) and
• S0 = S
• ⇠0i=
⇢ T
j2G ⇠j i 2 G
⇠i otherwise
• V 0 = V
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M, s |= RG  , M |G, s |=  
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Resolution: from distributed to common knowledge
  ::= p | ¬  |   ^   | Ki  | DG  | CG  | RG 
DG ! RGCG 
Resolution: from distributed to common knowledge
  ::= p | ¬  |   ^   | Ki  | DG  | CG  | RG 
DG ! RGCG 6|=
050
Resolution: from distributed to common knowledge
  ::= p | ¬  |   ^   | Ki  | DG  | CG  | RG 
DG ! RGCG 6|=
|= DGRG $ RGCG 
Resolving distributed knowledge: expressivity
ELD ⌘ ELCD ⌘ RD ⌘ RCD ⌘ PAD ⌘ PACD
(a) |ag| = 1
PACD RCDoo
ELD ⌘ RD ⌘ PAD // ELCD
(b) |ag| = 2
PACD RCD
ELD ⌘ RD ⌘ PAD // ELCD
OOii
(c) |ag|   3
RCD :   ::= p | ¬  |   ^   | Ki  | DG  | CG  | RG 
RD :   ::= p | ¬  |   ^   | Ki  | DG  | RG 
Resolution reduction axioms
The following are valid:
RGp$ p
RG(  ^  )$ RG  ^RG 
RG¬ $ ¬RG 
RGKi $ DGRG , when i 2 G
RGKi $ KiRG , when i 62 G
RGDH $ DG[HRG , when G \H 6= ;
RGDH $ DHRG , when G \H = ;
Axiomatisation: RD
(S5) classical proof system for multi-agent epistemic logic
(DK) characterization axioms for distributed knowledge
(RR) reduction axioms for resolution
(NR) from   infer RG 
Proposition: sound and complete.
DK:
(KD) DG( !  )! (DG ! DG )
(TD) DG !  
(5D) ¬DG ! DG¬DG 
(D1) Ki $ Di 
(D2) DG ! DH , if G ✓ H.
RD :   ::= p | ¬  |   ^   | Ki  | DG  | RG 
Axiomatisation: RCD
(S5) classical proof system for multi-agent epistemic logic
(CK) axioms and rules for common knowledge
(DK) characterization axioms for distributed knowledge
(NR) from   infer RG 
(RR) reduction axioms for resolution
(RRC) from  ! (EH  ^RG1 · · ·RGn ) infer
 ! RG1 · · ·RGnCH 
CK:
(KC) CG( !  )! (CG ! CG )
(TC) CG !  
(C1) CG ! EGCG 
(C2) CG( ! EG )! ( ! CG )
(NC) from   infer CG .
Theorem: sound and complete.
RCD :   ::= p | ¬  |   ^   | Ki  | DG  | CG  | RG 
Resolution: some open issues
• Other assumptions about what other agents know about the resolution event

• E.g., local updates

• Syntax vs. semantics and full communication

• Belief

• Expressive power: 

• compare to languages with relativised common knowledge

• Computational complexity
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Discussion
What Distributed Knowledge Actually Is
• Common interpretations of distributed knowledge:

• Knowledge the group could obtain if they had unlimited means of 
communication

• “A group has distributed knowledge of a fact phi if the knowledge of 
phi is distributed among its members, so that by pooling their 
knowledge together the members of the group can deduce phi ...”
A group has distributed knowledge of a fact phi 
if after “pooling their knowledge together” the 
members of the group know that phi was 
true before they did that
Interesting (and pretty much unexplored!) 
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C G': after  is announcedG has common knowledge that ' was true before that
ELRC
vv
oo // PARC
vv
ELRCD // PARCD
ELC
vv
//
OO
PAC
vv
//
3
OO
AMC
vv
ELCD
OO
// PACD //
3
OO
AMCD
EL oo //
vv
OO
PAL oo //
vv
OO
AML
vv
OO
ELD
OO
oo // PAD oo //
OO
AMD
OO
PARC
vv
// AMRC
uu
PARCD // AMRCD
ELRC //
✏✏
OO
vv
ELRC0
✏✏
OO
vv
ELRCD //
✏✏
OO
ELRC0D
✏✏
OO
Issues with distributed knowledge and the literature
• What it is (“pooling”) 
• Distributed belief is not belief, under many common 
assumptions about what belief is 
• Unsound axiomatisations 
• Allowing the empty coalition (universal modality) 
• “Not invariant under bisimulation”
Some related things I didn’t talk about
• Deeper philosophical accounts of group belief - both 
reductionist and non-reductionist  
• Formalisations: see Gaudou et al., 2015 
• Group knowledge in plausibility models (Baltag and 
Smets) 
• Belief merge (Baltag and Smets, MALLOW 2009) 
• Christoff et al., 2019 (under review) on priority merge 
(with resolution!)
The road ahead: group knowledge in social 
networks
• Parikh and Pacuit (2004): first steps towards analysing the information 
that can be shared by a group of agents restricted to a communication 
network 
• Seligman et al. (TARK 2013): epistemics of network events 
• On group formation in social networks 
• Smets and Velazquez-Quesada, LORI 2017: social selection 
• Xiong and Ågotnes, JoLLI 2019: on the logic of balance in social 
networks 
• Pedersen, Smets and Ågotnes, LORI 2019: on the formation of echo 
chambers
Summary
• Group belief is most often not actually belief 
• There is a range of notions of group belief corresponding to different aggregation rules, 
the extremes being general and distributed belief  
•  We developed techniques for dealing with distributed knowledge in completeness 
proofs, used for PAL, CL, GAL, CAL, resolving, .. 
• Epistemic coalition logic: general reasoning about group knowledge and group ability 
• Group ability and constructive knowledge: separating who knows how 
• Group and coalition announcement logics: ability through announcement 
• Resolving distributed knowledge 
• Captures exactly the relationship between distributed and common knowledge 
• Between group knowledge, dynamics and ability
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